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Globalization and
tax competition:
implications for
developing countries
Reuven S. Avi-Yonah
University of Michigan
Law School

This article analyses the effects of tax competition on
developing countries. Since the 1980s, globalization and
greater capital mobility have led many developing countries
to adopt the policy of competing with one another to attract
capital investment. One of the main forms taken by this
competition has been the granting of tax holidays and other
tax reductions to investing multinationals. This paper reviews
the normative arguments for and against this type of tax
competition, from a global perspective. It then examines
these arguments in depth from the point of view of
developing countries. The conclusion in general is that, since
transnational companies would invest in developing
countries even if they did not receive tax subsidies, but are
able to receive them through a kind of bidding process among
developing countries, it would be more advisable for the
latter to agree to refrain from granting such subsidies. Lastly,
consideration is given to some ways in which cooperation
of this sort could be achieved, either regionally or globally
(through the World Trade Organization, for example).
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I
Introduction
The current age of globalization can be distinguished
from the previous one (from 1870 to 1914) by the much
higher mobility of capital than labour (in the previous
age, before immigration restrictions, labour was at least
as mobile as capital). This increased mobility has been
the result of technological changes (the ability to move
funds electronically) and the relaxation of exchange
controls. The mobility of capital has led to tax
competition, in which sovereign countries lower their
tax rates on income earned by foreigners within their
borders in order to attract both portfolio and direct
investment. Tax competition, in turn, threatens to
undermine individual and corporate income taxes,
which remain major sources of revenue (in terms of
percentage of total revenue collected) for all modern
States. The response of both developed and developing
countries to these developments has been first, to shift

the tax burden from (mobile) capital to (less mobile)
labour, and second, when further increased taxation of
labour becomes politically and economically difficult,
to cut government services. Thus, globalization and tax
competition lead to a fiscal crisis for countries that wish
to continue to provide those government services to
their citizens, at the same time that demographic factors
and the increased income inequality, job insecurity and
income volatility that result from globalization render
such services more necessary. This paper argues that if
government service programmes are to be maintained
in the face of globalization, it is necessary to cut the
intermediate link by limiting tax competition. However,
from both practical and normative considerations, any
limits set to tax competition should be congruent with
maintaining the ability of democratic States to
determine the desirable size of their government.

II
International tax competition
and the taxation of capital
From its beginnings late in the nineteenth century, the
modern State has been financed primarily by
progressive income taxation. The income tax differs
from other forms of taxation (such as consumption or
social security taxes) in that in theory it includes income
from capital in the tax base, even if it is saved and not
consumed.
Because the rich save more than the poor, a tax that
includes income from capital in its base is more
progressive (taxes the rich more heavily) than a tax that
excludes income from capital (e.g., a consumption tax
or a payroll tax). However, the ability to tax saved income
from capital (i.e., income not vulnerable to consumption
This paper was commissioned from the author by the Fiscal
Division of the Integration and Regional Programs Department of
the Inter-American Development Bank ( IDB ). The opinions
expressed herein are not necessarily those of the Bank.

taxes) is impaired if the capital can be shifted overseas
to jurisdictions where it escapes taxation.
Two recent developments have dramatically
augmented the ability of both individuals and
corporations to earn income overseas free of income
tax: the effective end of withholding taxation by
developed countries, and the rise of production tax
havens in developing countries (Avi-Yonah, 2000).
Since the United States abolished its withholding tax
on interest paid to foreigners in 1984, no major capital
importing country has been able to impose such a tax
for fear of driving mobile capital elsewhere (or
increasing the cost of capital for domestic borrowers,
including the government itself) (Tanzi, 1995 and
Gardner, 1992). The result is that individuals can
generally earn investment income free of host country
taxation in any of the world’s major economies (AviYonah and Swartz, 1997; Cohen, 1998 and May, 1996).
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Moreover, even developed countries find it exceedingly
difficult to effectively collect the tax on the foreign
income of their individual residents in the absence of
withholding taxes imposed by host countries, because
the investments can be made through tax havens with
strong bank secrecy laws (Tanzi, 1995). Developing
countries, with much weaker tax administrations, find
this task almost impossible. Thus, cross-border
investment income can largely be earned free of either
host or home country taxation (Kant, 1996 and McLure,
1989).
For example, consider a wealthy Mexican who
wishes to earn tax-free interest income from investing
in the bonds of an American corporation. All he needs
to do is set up, for a nominal fee, a Cayman Islands
corporation to hold the bonds. The interest payments
are then made to the Caymans corporation without any
United States tax withheld under the so-called “portfolio
interest exemption” (United States Internal Revenue
Code section 871(h)). The individual does not report
the income to the Mexican tax authorities, and they
have no way of knowing that the Caymans corporation
is effectively an “incorporated pocketbook” of the
Mexican resident. Nor are the exchange of information
provisions of the United States-Mexico tax treaty of
any help, because the United States Internal Revenue
Service has no way of knowing that the recipient of the
interest payments is controlled by a Mexican resident
and therefore cannot report this to the Mexican
authorities. As a result, the income is earned completely
free of tax (the Caymans, of course, impose no income
taxes of their own).
When we switch our attention from passive to
productive investment, a similar threat to the taxing
capacity of both home and host jurisdictions emerges.
In the 1990s, competition for inbound investment led
an increasing number of countries (103, as of 1998) to
offer tax holidays specifically geared to foreign
corporate investors (Vernon, 1998 and UNCTAD, 1996).
Given the relative ease with which an integrated
multinational can shift production facilities in response
to tax rates, such “production tax havens” enable
multinationals to derive most of their income abroad
free of host country taxation (Hines and Rice, 1994
and Altshuler and Newlon, 1993). Moreover, most
developed countries (including the United States) do
not dare impose current taxation (or sometimes any
taxation) on the foreign source business income of their
resident multinationals, for fear of reducing the
competitiveness of those multinationals against
multinationals of other countries (Peroni, 1997). If they
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did, new multinationals could be set up as residents of
jurisdictions that do not tax such foreign source income
(Hines, 1991). Thus, business income can also be earned
abroad largely free of either host or home country
taxation.
For example, Intel Corporation, a top 10
multinational, has operations in more than 30 countries
around the globe. The company states that “[a]n Intel
chip developed at a design centre in Oregon, might be
manufactured at a wafer fabrication facility in Ireland,
packaged and tested in Malaysia, and then sold to a
customer in Australia. Another chip might be designed
in Japan, fabricated in Israel, packaged and tested in
Arizona, and sold in China” (Intel Corporation, 1998).
Specifically, outside the United States, Intel has major
manufacturing facilities in China, Ireland, Israel,
Malaysia, the Philippines and Puerto Rico (Intel
Corporation, 1999). Thus, outside the United States,
all of Intel’s manufacturing facilities are located in
countries granting tax holidays. Nor does Intel pay
current United States tax on its income from those
foreign operations, because under United States law,
active income earned by foreign subsidiaries of United
States multinationals is not taxed until it is repatriated
in the form of dividends, which Intel can delay for many
years (Avi-Yonah, 1997). Thus, the effective tax rate
on Intel’s foreign source income is far below the
nominal United States corporate rate of 35%.
If income from capital can escape the income tax
net, the tax becomes in effect a tax on labour. Several
empirical studies have in fact suggested that in some
developed jurisdictions the effective tax rate on income
from capital approaches zero, and tax rates on capital
have tended to go down sharply since the early 1980s,
when exchange controls were relaxed (Owens and
Sasseville, 1997 and Rodrik, 1997). As a result,
countries that used to rely on the revenues from income
tax are forced to increase relatively regressive taxes.
The two fastest growing taxes in OECD member countries
in recent years have been consumption taxes (from 12%
of total revenues in 1965 to 18% in 1995) and payroll
taxes (from 19% to 27%), both of which are more
regressive than income tax (Owens and Sasseville,
1997). Over the same period, personal and corporate
income taxes have not grown as a percentage of total
revenues (personal income tax accounted for 26% of
total revenues in 1965 and 27% in 1995, while the
figures for corporate income tax are 9% and 8%
respectively) (Owens and Sasseville, 1997). The total
tax revenue as a percentage of GDP in developed
countries went up sharply during the same period (from
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an average of 28% in 1965 to almost 40% in 1994),
and this increase is largely accounted for by the rise of
consumption and payroll taxes (World Bank, 1994).
Moreover, there is evidence that as the degree of
openness of an economy in OECD member countries
increases, taxes on capital tend to go down while taxes
on labour go up (income tax is imposed on both capital
and labour, so that its stability may mask this trend)
(Mendoza, Razin and Tesar, 1994 and Mendoza, MilesiFerretti and Asea, 1996).
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The same trends can be observed in developing
countries as well. In non-OECD member countries
(outside the Middle East) total government revenues
as a share of GDP rose from an average of 18.8% in
1975-1980 to 20.1% in 1986-1992 (World Bank, 1994).
This growth was financed primarily by the growth of
revenues from value added tax in the same period (from
25.5% of total revenues to 31.8%). At the same time,
revenues from both individual and corporate income
tax were flat or declined (World Bank, 1994).

III
Tax competition and the
developing countries
The drawbacks of tax competition for developed
countries are relatively clear, because such countries
have an elaborate social insurance safety net that
requires a high level of government expenditure and
that is threatened by tax competition (Leibfritz and
others, 1995). But how does tax competition affect
developing countries?
First, it should be pointed out that developing
countries need the revenues at least as much as
developed countries do, if not more. A common
misperception is that only OECD member countries are
confronted by a fiscal crisis as a result of the increasing
numbers of elderly people in the population. In fact,
the increase in dependency ratios (the ratio of the elderly
to the working population) is expected to take place in
other geographic areas as well, as fertility rates go down
and health care improves (World Bank, 1994). Outside
OECD and the transition economies, the dependency ratio
starts in the single digits in the 1990s, but rises to just
below 30% by 2100 (McLure, 1996). Moreover, while
outside OECD and the transition economies direct
spending on social insurance is much lower, other forms
of government spending (e.g., government
employment) effectively fulfil a social insurance role.
In Latin America, for example, direct government
spending on social insurance is much lower than
indirect spending through government employment and
procurement programmes (Subbarao and others, 1997).
Moreover, it seems strange to argue that developing
countries need tax revenues less than developed
countries because they have less developed social

insurance programmes. If one accepts the normative
case for social insurance, it applies to developing
countries with even greater force because of widespread
poverty, which means that losing a job can have much
direr consequences (UNDP, 1997). But the need for
revenues in developing countries goes far beyond social
insurance. In some developing countries, revenues are
needed to ensure the very survival of organized
government, as the Russian experience demonstrates
(The Economist, 1998). In other, more stable developing
countries revenues are needed primarily to provide for
adequate education (investment in human capital),
which many regard as the key to promoting
development (Sen, 1997). For example, the United
Nations has estimated that for only US$ 30 billion to
US$ 40 billion, all people in the world can obtain basic
social services, such as elementary education (UNDP,
1997). Given current trends in foreign aid, most of these
funds have to come from developing country
governments (United Nations, 2001).
Second, the standard advice by economists to small
open economies is that they should refrain from taxing
foreign investors, because such investors cannot be
made to bear the burden of any tax imposed by the
capital importing country (Razin and Sadka, 1991).
Therefore, the tax will necessarily be shifted to less
mobile factors in the host country, such as labour and/
or land, and it is more efficient to tax those factors
directly. But while this argument seems quite valid as
applied to portfolio investment, it seems less valid in
regard to foreign direct investment ( FDI), for two
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reasons. First, the standard advice does not apply if a
foreign tax credit is available in the home country of
the investor, which frequently would be the case for
FDI (Viherkentta, 1991). Second, the standard advice
assumes that the host country is small. However, an
extensive literature on multinationals suggests that
typically they exist in order to earn economic rents
(Hennart, 1991). In that case, the host country is no
longer “small” in the economic sense. That is, there is
a reason for the investor to be there and not elsewhere.
Therefore, any tax imposed on such rents (as long as it
is below 100%) will not necessarily drive the investor
to leave even if it is unable to shift the burden of the tax
to labour or landowners.
This argument clearly holds in the case of rents
that are linked to a specific location, such as natural
resources or a large market. But what if the rent can
be earned in a large number of potential locations
(Dunning, 1988)? In this case, the host country will
not be able to tax the rent if the multinational can
credibly threaten to go elsewhere, although once the
investment has been made the rent can be taxed. This
situation, which is probably the most common
(Hennart, 1991), would require coordinated action to
enable all host countries to tax the rent earned within
their borders. Some possibilities for such action are
described below.
This relates to the final argument, which is that
host countries need to offer tax incentives to be
competitive. An extensive literature has demonstrated
that taxes do in fact play a crucial role in determining
investment location decisions (Bond, 1981; Boskin and
Gale, 1987 and Hines, 1999). But all of these studies
emphasize that the tax incentives are crucial given the
availability of such incentives elsewhere (Guisinger and
others, 1985). Thus, it can be argued that given the need
for tax revenues, developing countries would in general
prefer to refrain from granting tax incentives, if only
they could be assured that no other developing country
would be able to grant such incentives (Avi-Yonah,
2000).
Thus, restricting the ability of developing countries
to compete in granting tax incentives does not truly
restrict their autonomy or counter their interests. That
is the case whenever they grant the incentive only for
fear of competition from other developing countries,
and would not have granted it but for such fear.
Whenever competition from other countries drives the
tax incentive, eliminating the competition does not hurt
the developing country, and may aid its revenue-raising
efforts (assuming it can attract investment on other
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grounds, which is typically the case). Moreover, under
the proposals described below, developing countries
remain free to lower their tax rates generally (as
opposed to granting specific tax relief aimed at foreign
investors).
Two additional points need to be made from a
developing country perspective. The first concerns the
question of tax incidence. Since the tax competition
that is most relevant to developing countries concerns
the corporate income tax, it is important to attempt to
assess the incidence of that tax in evaluating the effects
of collecting it on the welfare of the developing country.
Unfortunately, after decades of analysis, no consensus
exists on the incidence of corporate tax. While the older
studies have tended to conclude that the tax is borne by
shareholders or by all capital providers, more recent
studies have suggested that the tax is borne to a
significant extent by consumers or by labour (Pechman,
1987 and United States, Department of the Treasury,
1992). Another possibility is that the tax on established
corporations was borne by those who were shareholders
at the time the tax was imposed or increased, because
thereafter it is capitalized into the price of the shares
(Pechman, 1987). It is unlikely that this debate will be
decided any time soon (in fact, the incidence may be
shifting over time, especially as globalization may
enable corporations to shift more of the tax burden to
labour). However, from the perspective of a developing
country deciding whether to collect taxes from a
multinational, three out of the four possible alternatives
for incidence (current shareholders or capital providers,
old shareholders, and consumers) are largely the
residents of other jurisdictions, and therefore from a
national welfare perspective the developing country
gains by collecting the tax. And even if some of the tax
is shifted to labour in the developing country, it can be
argued that as a matter of tax administration it is more
efficient (as well as more politically acceptable) to
collect the tax from the multinational than to attempt
to collect it from the workers.
Finally, it should be noted that a developing
country may want to collect taxes from multinationals
even if in general it believes that the private sector is
more efficient in using the resources than the public
sector. That is because in the case of a foreign
multinational, the taxes that the developing country fails
to collect may indeed be used by the private sector, but
in another jurisdiction, and therefore not benefit the
developing country. One possible solution, which is in
fact employed by developing countries, is to refrain
from taxing multinationals while they re-invest
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domestically, but tax them upon remittance of the profits
abroad. However, such taxation of dividends and other
forms of remittance is subject to the same tax
competition problem that we discussed above. Thus, it
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would appear that overcoming the tax competition
problem is in most cases in the interest of developing
countries, and the question remains how to do so in the
face of the collective action problem described above.

IV
What can be done about
tax competition?
The tax competition problem is thus essentially a
problem of coordination and trust. Each jurisdiction
would prefer to tax investors from abroad to gain the
revenue, but is afraid that by doing so it would drive
the investors to other jurisdictions that do not tax them.
If there was a way to coordinate actions among the
relevant jurisdictions, they all could gain added
revenues without running the risk of losing the
investment.
A good illustration of how this dynamic works is
the history of German taxation of interest income. In
1988, Germany introduced a 10% withholding tax on
interest paid to bank depositors, but had to abolish it
within a few months because of the magnitude of capital
flight to Luxembourg. In 1991, the German Federal
Constitutional Court held that withholding taxes on
wages but not on interest violated the constitutional right
to equality. The Government thereupon reintroduced
the withholding tax on interest, but made it inapplicable
to non-residents (Muten, 1994). Non-residents may,
however, be Germans investing through Luxembourg
bank accounts. To cope with this problem, the Germans
have led a European Union effort to introduce a 20%
withholding tax on all interest payments to European
Union residents (European Union, 1998). However,
both Luxembourg and the United Kingdom have so far
blocked the adoption of this plan, arguing that it will
lead to a flight of investors to Switzerland or the United
States (Annells, 1998).
Thus, the key to finding a solution to the tax
competition problem is to attack it on a broad
multilateral basis, through an organization such as OECD.
Under current conditions, OECD is the natural choice
for leading such coordinated actions against tax
competition, for three reasons. First, for individual
investors to earn decent returns on their capital without
incurring excessive risks, they need to invest in an OECD

member country. Tax havens do not offer adequate
investment opportunities, and developing countries are
generally considered too risky for portfolio investment
(other than through mutual funds, which do not offer
tax avoidance opportunities). Thus, if all OECD members
enforced taxation of portfolio investment, it could be
subject to tax without requiring cooperation from the
tax havens.
Second, about 85% of the world’s multinationals
are headquartered in OECD member countries. This is
likely to continue to be the case for a while, because
OECD members offer stable corporate and securities
law protection to investors that is lacking in other
countries. Thus, if all OECD members agreed on a
coordinated basis to tax their multinationals currently
on their income from abroad, most of the problem of
tax competition from direct investment could be
solved.
Third, OECD has the required expertise (its model
tax treaty is the global standard) and has already started
on the path of limiting tax competition. In 1998, it
adopted a report entitled Harmful Tax Competition: An
Emerging Global Issue (OECD, 1998). This report is
somewhat limited, because it only addresses tax
competition for financial activities and services (as
opposed to, e.g., Intel’s manufacturing plants). It also
does not address the taxation of investment income.
But it represents an extremely useful first step, and proof
that a consensus can be reached on the tax competition
issue (Luxembourg and Switzerland abstained, but did
not dare veto the adoption of the report by the other 27
members of OECD).
A useful distinction is drawn by OECD between tax
competition in the form of generally applicable lower
tax rates, and tax regimes designed to attract foreign
investors. This distinction is both normatively and
pragmatically sound: restricting tax competition should
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not and cannot mean that voters in democratic countries
lose their right to determine the size of the public sector
through general tax increases or reductions. But it does
mean that countries should not provide windfalls for
foreign investors at the expense of the ability of other
countries to provide those public services their residents
desire. Such limitations are particularly appropriate
because those foreign investors themselves often reside
in countries providing a high level of services, and yet
refuse to pay the tax price that providing such services
entails.
Depending on OECD for solving the tax competition
problem suffers from one major drawback: developing
countries are left out, and may perceive actions by OECD
as a cartel of rich countries operating at their expense.
In fact, as pointed out above, it is unlikely that tax
competition benefits developing countries, which can
also use the tax revenues they give up to attract foreign
investors. If all developing countries could be prevented
from competing in this fashion, they all could gain. But
in the longer run, it may be better to entrust the fight
against harmful tax competition to WTO , in which
developing countries are adequately represented. This
would also solve the problem of what to do about the
15% of multinationals that are not headquartered in
OECD member countries (a percentage that can be
expected to grow if OECD indeed moves to restrict tax
competition for its multinationals).
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To sum up: as a result of globalization and tax
competition, tax rules can no longer be set by countries
acting unilaterally or by bilateral tax treaties. In a world
in which capital can move freely across national borders
and multinationals are free to choose among many
investment locations, the ability of any one country (or
any two countries in cooperation) to tax (or otherwise
regulate) such capital is severely limited. Any such
unilateral attempt will be undercut by other countries,
and will probably not be even attempted in the name of
preserving national competitiveness. Thus, a multilateral
solution is essential if the fundamental goals of taxation
or other regulation are to be preserved. Private market
activities that span the globe can only be regulated or
taxed by organizations with a similar global reach.
This paper has attempted to outline some of the
ways in which such global governance can be achieved
in the area of capital income taxation. Achieving this
goal will not be easy, given the expected resistance of
both private actors eager to preserve their freedom from
taxation and of governments concerned about
preserving their sovereign ability to set their own tax
rules. But it is not impossible. Moreover, since
preserving the ability of nations to tax income from
capital is essential to the achievement of several
crucially important goals (like the preservation and
development of adequate government services to the
poor), it must be tried.
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